Philosophy 291
Philosophy of Language and Mind 
Spring Quarter 2001
Andrew Mills' 
Homepage		 Course Resources
Homepage 		 Dept. of Religion
and Philosophy		  
A Reconstruction of Frege’s Argument
Against the Direct Reference Theory of Names

Consider the following two sentences:

(A) Marilyn Monroe is Marilyn Monroe

(B) Marilyn Monroe is Norma Jean Baker

 Now consider the following argument against the view that the meaning of a name is simply the object it denotes (in this case, the famous actress from the 1950s).

Premise 1: (A) and (B) have a different "epistemic status". That is, (A) can be known a priori, while to know (B) requires research and the amassing of evidence. Moreover, there are people who believe (A) without believing (B).

Premise 2: (A) and (B) differ semantically; they mean different things.

This is offered as the best explanation of the fact claimed in Premise 1
Premise 3: Differences in what two statements mean can only be due to differences in the meanings of their parts.
What a sentence says is a function of the meanings of its parts. If (A) and (B) differ in meaning, it must be because some part of (A) differs in meaning from some part of (B).
Premise 4: The only difference between (A) and (B) is that ‘Marilyn Monroe’ appears in (A) where ‘Norma Jean Baker’ appears in (B).

Premise 5: So, ‘Marilyn Monroe’ and ‘Norma Jean Baker’ have different meanings.

This follows logically from Premises 2, 3, and 4 taken together. Premise 6: If the Direct Reference Theory of names is right, ‘Marilyn Monroe’ and ‘Norma Jean Baker’ would have the same meaning (because they are names of the same individual).

Conclusion: So, the Direct Reference Theory of names is wrong.

This follows logically from Premises 5 and 6 taken together.