 |
Philosophy
200/300
Greek Philosophy
Fall Quarter 2001
|
A Recap of An Argument
in Republic I
At 341a, Thrasymachus makes the following claim:
A ruler, insofar as he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly
decrees what is best for himself, and this his subject must do.
Rulers rule in order to further their own interests: they set up laws which,
if the subject obeys them, serve the ruler’s interests, not the subject’s.
(Think of a dictator who lays down laws which exploit his subjects for
his own ends—he makes them fight in his wars, work in his mines, etc.)
Given this conception of rulers, the subject who acts justly—that is, follows
the laws and decrees of the ruler—acts so as to further the ruler’s interests.
Socrates now argues that no ruler can possible legislate in his own
interest. Here’s the argument:
1. Every art (or craft) serves the interest of its subject.
2. Ruling is an art (or craft).
3. So, ruling serves the interest of its subject.
The argument is clearly valid, but we need to examine whether the premises
are true. In particular, what should concern us is (1) and what "subject"
means. We might say that (1) is a generalization from such examples as
these:
A physician’s business is to treat his patients
A groom’s business is to care for the horses
A shepherd’s business is to care for the sheep
These examples suggest the following conception of ‘subject’:
S1. The subject of a craft is something upon which the craft is practiced.
Yet if this is how to understand ‘subject’, then (1) is wrong. Why? Because
there are crafts which do not serve the interests of their subjects.
Chicken slaughtering is a craft and its subject, according to (S1), must
be chickens. But chicken slaughtering does not serve the interests of chickens.
Hangmen are craftsmen, and the subject of their craft are the people they
execute, but this craft does not serve the interests of those people. More
mundanely, the subject (in the sense of (S1)) of shoemaking is leather,
wax, string, glue, and nails, but the shoemaker is not seeking to serve
the interest of these raw materials, rather he is seeking to make shoes.
So (1), where ‘subject’ is interpreted as in (S1), is simply false.
There is, though another definition of ‘subject’ which renders (1) true.
To see this, consider what the jobs of these craftsmen are. It’s the doctor’s
job to heal the sick and keep the healthy in continuing good health. The
groom’s job is to groom the horse in his charge. The slaughterer’s job
is to produce slaughtered animals. The shepherd’s job is to graze the sheep
and keep the wolves away. And so on. Notice that in each case the interest
of the craft is to bring about a state of affairs. And, importantly,
in
no case is that state of affairs the same as the craftsman looking after
himself. Baldly put, the job description of these crafts never includes
anything about looking after the craftsman himself. So instead of (S1)
we have
S2. The subject of a craft is that product or state of affairs that
the craft is meant to realize.
With (S2) in hand, we can re-read premise (1) as
(1*) Every craft is practiced with a view to producing a certain object
or state of affairs, and those who practice the craft are, strictly speaking,
interested only in producing that object or state of affairs.
(1*) is plausible, if not true. It’s more or less the claim that every
craft has a job description, and those who practice the craft are, strictly
speaking, interested in filling the job description. The problem now is
that if we understand (1) as (1*), we must revise our understanding of
(3). (3) now becomes
(3*) The job of ruling has a job description—that rulers are interested
in bringing about a state of affairs—and those who rule are, strictly speaking,
interested only in producing that state of affairs.
But what is it that rulers do? What is the job description of ruling? Doctors
heal the sick, slaughterers slaughter, grooms groom, shepherds herd sheep--and
rulers rule. That is, being a ruler involves being the highest executive
authority and administrating in some body politic. That’s the job description
of ruling. But, and here’s the problem, this is too thin a job description
for Plato’s needs. Both tyrants and selfless public servants are rulers
in this sense—they both fit the job description—but tyrants serve their
own interests and committed public servants serve their subjects’ interests.
Look at it this way. What a doctor, a groom, a slaughterer and a shepherd
are supposed to do is clearly implied by the meaning of "doctor", "groom",
"slaughterer" and "shepherd". And what a ruler is supposed to do is similarly
implied by the meaning of the word "ruler": to be a ruler is just to be
the highest executive authority in a city. But this is too thin for Plato's
needs, since from the meaning of "ruler" nothing follows as to whether
or not a ruler is a generous or cruel to his subjects. So, even if we allow,
as we must, that governing a city is a distinct job, and that it is implied
by the very meaning of the word ‘ruler’, we still cannot get out of all
that what Plato is after—namely, that the function of a ruler must be to
look after the well-being of the governed.
(This analysis of what's going on is adapted from--and in parts just
verbatim quotes of--George Nakhnikian, An Introduction to Philosophy
(New
York: Alfred A Knopf), 1967, pp.46-9)
Back
to Handouts and Assignments Page