Philosophy 210/310 Early Modern Philosophy  Andrew Mills'  Homepage Course Resources Homepage Dept. of Religion and Philosophy

Instructions Please answer all of the following questions. Your typed, double-spaced, answers are due to Prof. Mills (either by email, in his mailbox, or to him in person) by 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday 12 February. You are on your honor not to discuss these questions with any person other than Prof. Mills.  You may consult your books and your notes (no websites), but the answers you write must be your own. If you cite or refer to a passage from one of the authors, please give the appropriate reference.  If you have questions about issues concerning academic honesty, please consult the syllabus, or talk to Prof. Mills. There is no length limit for these answers, but I am trusting you to edit yourself.  Please stick to the question, and make sure to answer all parts of each question.

Some Helpful Tips Your primary focus in writing this exam should be to make your views, and the views of the philosophers you are writing about, clear to someone who is not as familiar with the material as you or I are.  Toward that end, you should write in whatever style is most comfortable.  Most philosophical writing is in the first person, and in the present tense (that is, the author uses "I" and talks to the reader, as in a letter), and if you find that style comfortable, you should use it.  I find it best to conceive of your reader not as me, nor even as someone else in the class, but rather as an intelligent person who has passing familiarity with the material, but not as close a familiarity as you do.  Thinking of your reader in this way will force you to be clear and precise and fully explain yourself.

Your responses will be graded on clarity, accuracy, sensitivity to the philosophical issues, as well as general organizational and grammatical issues.

1. Explain Descartes’ argument (in Paragraph 10 of the Sixth Meditation) for the existence of corporeal things. Why is it crucial that Descartes have established God’s existence before he can establish the existence of corporeal things like rocks and tables?

 
2. Explain the differences between Occasionalism (the view of Malebranche and Bayle) and Pre-Established Harmony (the view of Leibniz). What are they views about? Which view is better? Give reasons to defend your choice.

 
3. Explain the difference between primary qualities and secondary qualities. In doing so, pay particular attention to the distinction between the qualities of objects and our ideas of them. Select what you consider the best argument of Locke’s for this distinction. Explain that argument and critically assess it.

 
4. In the following passage Descartes argues that animals (or "brutes" as he sometimes calls them) do not have thoughts or understanding. (a) What is his argument for this conclusion? (b) What is the distinction between thoughts and passions, and how is that relevant to the argument? (c) Is his argument a good one? Why or why not? (That is, assess the strength of the argument he has offered—the reasons he has given in support of his conclusion—and do not merely address the conclusion.)

I cannot share the opinion of Montaigne and others who attribute understanding or thought to animals. I am not worried that people say that men have an absolute empire over all the other animals; because I agree that some of them are stronger than us, and believe that there may also be some who have an instinctive cunning capable of deceiving the shrewdest human beings. But I observe that they only imitate or surpass us in those of our actions which are not guided by our thoughts. It often happens that we walk or eat without thinking at all about what we are doing; and similarly, without using our reason, we reject things which are harmful for us, and parry the blows aimed at us. Indeed, even if we expressly willed not to put our hands in front of our head when we fall, we could not prevent ourselves. I think also that if we had no thought we would eat, as the animals do, without having to learn to; and it is said that those who walk in their sleep sometimes swim across streams in which they would drown if they were awake. As for the movements of our passions, even though in us they are accompanied with thought because we have the faculty of thinking, it is nonetheless very clear that they do not depend on thought, because they often occur in spite of us. Consequently they can also occur in animals, even more violently than they do in human beings, without our being able to conclude from that that they have thoughts.

In fact, none of our external actions can show anyone who examines them that our body is not just a self-moving machine by contains a soul with thoughts, with the exception of words, or other signs that are relevant to particular topics without expressing any passion. I say words or other signs, because deaf-mutes use signs as we use spoken words; and I say that these signs must be relevant, to exclude the speech of parrots, without excluding the speech of madmen, which is relevant to particular topics even though it does not follow reason. I add also that these words or signs must not express any passion, to rule out not only cries of joy or sadness and the like, but also whatever can be taught by training to animals. If you teach a magpie to say good-day to its mistress, when it sees her approach, this can only be by making the utterance of this word the expression of one of its passions. For instance it will be an expression of the hope of eating, if it has always been given a titbit when it says it. Similarly, all the things which dogs, horses, and monkeys are taught to perform are only expressions of their fear, their hope, or their joy; and consequently they can be performed without any thought. Now it seems to me very striking that the use of words, so defined, is something particular to human beings. Montaigne and Charron may have said that there is more difference between one human being and another than between a human being and an animal; but there has never been known an animal so perfect as to use a sign to make other animals understand something which expressed no passion; and there is no human being so imperfect as not to do so, since even deaf-mutes invent special signs to express their thoughts. This seems to me a very strong argument to prove that the reason why animals do not speak as we do is not that they lack the organs but that they have no thoughts. It cannot be said that they speak to each other and that we cannot understand them; because since dogs and some other animals express their passions to us, they would express their thoughts also if they had any.

I know that animals do many things better than we do, but this does not surprise me. It can even be used to prove that they act naturally and mechanically, like a clock which tells the time better than our judgment does. Doubtless when the swallows come in spring, they operate like clocks. The actions of the honeybees are of the same nature, and the discipline of cranes in flight, and of apes in fighting, if it is true that they keep discipline. Their instinct to bury their dead is no stranger than that of dogs and cats who scratch the earth for the purpose of burying their excrement; they hardly ever actually bury it, which shows that they act only by instinct and without thinking. The most that one can say is that though the animals do not perform any action which shows us that they think, still, since the organs of their body are not very different from ours, it may be conjectured that there is attached to those organs some thoughts such as we experience in ourselves, but of a very much less perfect kind. To which I have nothing to reply except that if they thought as we do, they would have an immortal soul like us. This is unlikely, because there is no reason to believe it of some animals without believing it of all, and many of them such as oysters and sponges are too imperfect for this to be credible. But I am afraid of boring you with this discussion…..

[From a letter from Descartes to the Marquess of Newcastle, 23 November 1646. In Descartes: Philosophical Letters, Anthony Kenny, translator and editor. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).]