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Philosophy
210/310
Early Modern Philosophy
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The Argument for the "Real
Distinction" between the Mind and the Body (9th paragraph of the Sixth
Meditation)
Taken from Georges Dicker, Descartes:
An Analytical and Historical Introduction
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If I can clearly and distinctly
conceive X existing in a certain way, then X can really exist in that way,
at least by God's power.
This follows from the clarity-and-distinctness criterion of truth
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If I can clearly and distinctly
concieve X existing apart from Y, then X really can exist without Y, at
least by God's power
This is just an instance of (1)
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If X really can exist without
Y, no matter by what power, then X and Y are really two different things.
The idea here is that the mere possibility of separate existence implies
actual
distinctness
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If I can clearly and distinctly
conceive X existing apart from Y, then X and Y are really two different
things.
This follows from (2) and (3), taken together
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I can clearly and distinctly
conceive of myself, a thinking and non-extended thing, existing apart from
my body, an extended and non-thinking thing.
This is the most important premise. This claim that Descartes has
a clear and distinct
idea of himself as a non-extended thing seems unwarranted.
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I really am a different thing
from my body
This follows from (4) and (5), taken together
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I can exist without my body,
at least by God's power.
This follows from (2) and (6), taken together