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Philosophy
210/310
Early Modern Philosophy
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Study
Questions for Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Book I, Chapter i
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What is Locke's project in the Essay? How does he think this will
enable him to fend off the sceptics? (What is a sceptic, by the way?)
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Why should we start philosophy by understanding understanding?
Book I, Chapter ii
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What's the "universal consent" argument for innate ideas? What is
Locke's response to that argument?
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What reason does Locke give for rejecting the idea that there are innate
ideas which are "unknown" or "unperceived" by the mind?
Book II, Chs i-ii
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What is the difference between a "soul" and a "man", according to Locke?
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Locke draws a number of absurd consequences from the claim that a soul
always thinks (and, in particular, that it thinks when the man is asleep).
He does this in order to argue against the claim that a soul always thinks.
What are the absurd consequences in question? Do you agree with his
argument here?
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What, in particular, is the point of the Castor and Pollux discussion?
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What is the point of the analogy with hunger in II.i.19?
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What is the distinction between simple ideas and complex ideas?
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By what powers does the mind construct complex ideas out of simple ones?
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In what sense is the understanding passive? In what sense active?
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What is the point of II.ii.3?
Book II, Chs iii-viii
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What is the difference between hardness and solidity?
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What is the difference between an idea and a quality? What is the
relationship between them?
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What is the distinction between primary and secondary qualities?
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What are the primary qualities? What are the secondary qualities?
Is it the case that all the ideas that are "ideas of one sense" are secondary
qualities? Explain.
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What evidence persuades him that qualities come in these two kinds?
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What is the point of the grain of wheat discussion in Ch. VIII, Sect. 9?
There is an argument for the primary qualities there--try to reconstruct
it.
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How does Locke know that the qualities he thinks are primary are actually
primary and that the qualities he thinks are secondary are actually secondary?
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What's the point of the analogy with pain and steel dividing our flesh
in Ch. VIII, Sect. 13?
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If green is a secondary quality which belongs to the mind and not to objects,
then how does Locke explain why I see green when I look at grass? What
role does the grass play? What else plays a role?
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(IMPORTANT) Why does Locke think that the ideas of primary qualities resemble
the qualities in the objects, but that the ideas of secondary qualities
do not resemble qualities in the objects?
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What point is Locke making with the example of fire which produces the
sensations both of warmth and pain?
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Indeed, why does Locke talk so much about the power that things have to
cause us pain? What role does that play in his argument?
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What's the point of the almond pounding case in Ch. VIII, Sect. 20?
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What point is he making with the example a cold hand and a warm hand stuck
in the same pail of water?
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The discussion of the sun and its effects on us and a lump of wax in Ch.
VIII, Sect. 24 is very interesting. What is Locke's argument there?
Does it persuade you of his conclusion? (He repeats the nerve of the argument
in Sect. 25.)
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Descartes drew a distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Are there significant differences between Locke's account of the distinction
and Descartes'?
Book II, Ch. xxiii
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What is our complex idea of "substance"? Why is our idea of substance
a complex, and not a simple, idea?
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What does Locke mean by "substratum"? Why are we driven to suppose
that there is some substratum? What is the relationship between the
substratum and all the qualities of a thing?
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Do we have a clear idea of substance? Why or why not?
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Locke's discussion of substance should remind you of Descartes' discussion
of the wax in Meditation II. Compare what Locke says to that passage
from Descartes.
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What are the three sorts of simple ideas that make up our complex idea
of corporeal substance? (See Sect 9)
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Do you think that microscopes give us a "more accurate" view of how things
really are? Does Locke?
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If our senses, unaided, are not useful for perceiving the true natures
of things, then what are they useful for? And if our senses are not
useful for perceiving the true natures of things, how are we to discover
those natures?
Book II, Ch. xxvii
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Why doesn't the identity of a "man" consist in the identity of a soul?
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In virtue of what does the identity of a substance consist? human
being (="man")? person? That is, what are the conditions under which
we can say that this substance is the same substance as that one?
And, similarly, for "human being" and "person" in place of the term "substance".
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What does Locke mean by "man" (or, a better term, "human being")?
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What is the point of the story about the talking parrot?
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What does Locke mean by "person"? Do all persons have to be human
beings? Do all human beings (i.e., "men", in Locke's terminology)
have to be persons? Explain.
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There are a number of people who existed three years ago. One of
them, presumably, is you. Which one? What has to be the case,
according to Locke, for that person to be you?
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If being the same person from one time to the next does not consist in
being the same thinking substance (see Sect. 10), then what does it consist
in?
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What is the point of Locke's discussion of severing a limb or your little
finger?
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If you have the same soul that Socrates had does that make you the same
person as Socrates? If you need more information about the case to
answer this question, what more information do you need? What is
Locke's view here?
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What would have to be the case for you to be the same person as Socrates?
To be the same human being as Socrates?
Are you asleep and you awake the same person, according to Locke?
Why or why not?