Philosophy 210/310 Early Modern Philosophy  Andrew Mills'  Homepage Course Resources Homepage Dept. of Religion and Philosophy

Study Questions for Malebranche, Leibniz, and Bayle on Interactionism

Malebranche, The Search After Truth, Book VI, Pt. 2, Ch. 3

1. In the first two pages, Malebranche offers and argument for the claim that bodies cannot be true causes or powers.  What is that argument.  (Clue: the argument has the structure of a reductio ad absurdum.  That is, Malebranche argues that absurd consequences would follow from the view that bodies were true causes or powers.)
2. What is Malebranche’s argument for the claim that finite, created minds (i.e., human minds) cannot be true causes of the motion of bodies?  The careful reader will see that there are actually two separate arguments for this claim.  (Warning: Don’t say, “Because God is the only true cause,” for it is that claim which Malebranche is ultimately trying to establish.  But to prove that, he first has to show that finite minds are not causes.)
3. Once Malebranche has established that neither bodies nor finite minds can be the true causes of motion in bodies, he’s all set to argue that God is the only true cause.  How does this argument go?  (In reconstructing it, you should make use of the claims that bodies cannot be true causes and finite minds cannot be true causes.)
4. Someone might offer the following objection to Malebranche’s view that God is the only true cause:  “It is not true that God is the only true cause.  God was the first cause, but God created finite minds and endowed them with causal powers.  In particular, God endowed them with causal powers over their own body.  God, in other words, willed that whatever I will with regard to my body (i.e., that I raise my arm or turn my head) take place. So that means that I’m now a true cause.”  How does Malebranche reply to this objection?
5. Occasionalism—the view which Malebranche is arguing for, the view that God is the only true cause—seems to be in direct conflict with certain ordinary ways of speaking: “The baseball broke the window,” “The cat killed the mouse”, “The ice cream made me happy”, “I leapt up because I was in pain.”  Here, after all are cases where we are ascribing causal powers to things—baseballs, cats, ice cream, my pain—that aren’t God.  How does Malebranche propose to understand these sorts of statements?

1. What’s the problem, or problems, that Leibniz has with Occasionalism?  Where do Leibniz and Malebranche agree? (What, by the way, does “deus et machina” mean?)
2. If Leibniz rejects Malebranche’s account of how the fire causes me pain, and he rejects Descartes’ account of this, how does he propose to explain it?  What, in other words, is Leibniz’ positive view?  In setting out his view, try to highlight the ways in which it is different from Occasionalism.
3. What is the point of Leibniz’ talk of harmony between substances?
4. Leibniz speaks of us having “a perfect independence relative to the influence of every other creature”.  What does he mean by this?  He also thinks that this shows that we are free and also immortal.  How does it do that?
5. Leibniz thinks that his view preserves “ordinary ways of speaking”—that is, we can still say that it is the fire which caused me pain.  How can he say that if he thinks that all substances (which include me and the fire) are perfectly independent of each other?  In what way does Leibniz think he can preserve ordinary ways of speaking about causal interaction between substances?

1. As Bayle sees it, Leibniz’s doctrine of pre-established harmony has a very bizarre consequence.  What is it?
2. Why does Bayle find this consequence difficult to understand?  What, in other words, does Bayle find puzzling about this consequence?
3. According to Bayle, Leibniz has misunderstood Occasionalism.  Explain the misunderstanding, and the proper (according to Bayle) way to understand the view.
4. What is the point of Bayle’s remark (near the end of the selection) that souls are simple?  What does it mean to say that a soul is simple? How does Bayle use the simplicity of the soul to criticize Leibniz’s view?

1. What is Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s remark about the dog moving from joy to pain (allegedly) all on its own?  Leibniz thinks that Bayle’s objection here grows out of Bayle’s adherence to a certain general principle, which Leibniz accepts as well.  What is that principle?  If Leibniz accepts this principle, and if Bayle’s objection follows from it, what is Leibniz’s response to the objection?
2. What is Leibniz’s response to Bayle’s point about the simplicity of the soul?  Leibniz’s response involves drawing a distinction between two senses of ‘acting uniformly’.  What is this distinction?  How does it help Leibniz respond to Bayle?
3. What do you think: Does Occasionalism require a constant miracle?  Neither side in this dispute wants to be committed to the view that there are constant miracles happening.  Why do you think that is?  Why, in other words, would one want to avoid a view which implied that there were miracles happening all the time, everywhere? (Hint: It’s not because these folks are atheists.)