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Philosophy
210/310
Early Modern Philosophy
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Hume, "Of Liberty and Necessity":
The Central Passages
You should, of course, read the entire section, but in your reading of
this section of Hume's Enquiry, you should make sure that you understand
at least the following passages, and how they fit together to form Hume's
argument.
The Doctrine of Necessity
It is universally allowed, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated
by a necessary force, and that every natural effect is so precisely determined
by the energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances,
could possibly have resulted from it.
Where our idea of necessity comes from, and what it consists in
Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the
uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where similar objects
are constantly conjoined together and the mind is determined by custom
to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances
form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond
the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference
from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity, or connexion.
The Necessity of Human Action
It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among
the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains
still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always
produce the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes.
Thus it appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary
actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect
in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been
universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject
of dispute, either in philosophy or common life.
The Contrareity of Events
From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophers form a
maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary,
and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret
opposition of contrary causes.
Inference
It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action
of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this inference
from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct.
The Prisoner: Necessity in the physical and human realm
...when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together,
and form only one chain of argument, we shall make no scruple to allow
that they are of the same nature, and derived from the same principles.
A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility
of his escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as
the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for
his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one,
than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted
to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and
fidelity of his guards, as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His
mind runs along a certain train of ideas: the refusal of the soldiers to
consent to his escape; the action of the executioner; the separation of
the head and body; bleeding, convulsive motions, and death. Here is a connected
chain of natural causes and voluntary actions; but the mind feels no difference
between them in passing from one link to another...
The Denial of Necessity: A diagnosis (1)
If we examine the operations of body, and the production of effects from
their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther
in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular
objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried,
by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of
the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the
result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject, men still entertain a
strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers
of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the
cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the
operations of their own minds, and feel no such connexion of the motive
and the action; they are thence apt to suppose, that there is a difference
between the effects which result from material force, and those which arise
from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing
farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of
objects, and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another,
and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have
place in voluntary actions; we may be more easily led to own the same necessity
common to all causes.
The Denial of Necessity: A diagnosis (2)
The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for, from another
cause, viz. a false sensation of seeming experience which we have, or may
have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our actions. The necessity
of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly speaking,
a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may
consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his
thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects;
as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that
determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, which we feel,
in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any
succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though, in reflecting on human
actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly
able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and
from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in
performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it:
And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has
been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty....
Liberty as applied to human actions
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according
to the determinations of the will; this is, if we choose to remain at rest,
we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty
is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and
in chains.
Consequences for morality
the doctrines, both of necessity and of liberty, as above explained, are
not only consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to its
support.
Necessity and Blame
Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they
proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person
who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour, if good; nor
infamy, if evil.
actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal
principles in the mind; and when, by an alteration of these principles,
they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal. But,
except upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and
consequently never were criminal.
The Regress Objection
It may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to
the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued
chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from
the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature.
No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. While
we act, we are, at the same time, acted upon. The ultimate Author of all
our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on
this immense machine, and placed all beings in that particular position,
whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, must result.
Human actions, therefore, either can have no moral turpitude at all, as
proceeding from so good a cause; or if they have any turpitude, they must
involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their
ultimate cause and author.
The Response
The mind of man is so formed by nature that, upon the appearance of certain
characters, dispositions, and actions, it immediately feels the sentiment
of approbation or blame; nor are there any emotions more essential to its
frame and constitution....
Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the
sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects?
A man who is robbed of a considerable sum; does he find his vexation for
the loss anywise diminished by these sublime reflections? Why then should
his moral resentment against the crime be supposed incompatible with them?
Or why should not the acknowledgment of a real distinction between vice
and virtue be reconcileable to all speculative systems of philosophy, as
well as that of a real distinction between personal beauty and deformity?
Both these distinctions are founded in the natural sentiments of the human
mind: And these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical
theory or speculation whatsoever.